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THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
AND UNOCAL: TWIN BARRIERS TO
SHAREHOLDER WELFARE
"An evil soul, producing holy witness,
Is like a villain with a smiling cheek,
A goodly apple rotten at the heart.
0, what a goodly outside falsehood hath."
Antonio, in Shakespeare's The Merchant
of Venice, Act 1:3, 11. 99-102.
Antonio, a modern merchant of Venice, is a shareholder in a
Delaware corporation. The board has recently implemented a defensive measure in response to a hostile takeover attempt.' A disappointed Antonio sues, confident that the Delaware courts will
uphold his claim. After all, these magistrates have smiled graciously upon shareholders by adding the requirement that directors satisfy the Unocal test' before business judgment rule protecSee Hogg, Hostile Takeovers And Other War Games in THE PREDATOR AND THE PREDATEE 1
n.1 (1988). When "acquisitions are sought over the obligation of the target's management . .. the acquisition is 'hostile'. . . . The acquisition, which may be of control (frequently 51% of the outstanding common stock), or more than control, or total, is commonly referred to as a 'takeover' -the target being 'taken' and not 'given by consent.' "
Id. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Del. 1987)
(predator owning 9.95 percent of targets stock commenced hostile offer for 42 percent of
target's outstanding shares); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d
173, 178 (Del. 1986) (hostile offer made to target for $56.25 conditioned on nullification
of rights plan, waiver of notes covenants and "election of three Pantry Pride directors to
the Revlon board."); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 109 (Del.
1986) (predator corporation made tender offer for any and all shares of target for $56 per
share cash); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (owning
13 percent of target's stock, shareholder made hostile tender offer for 37 percent of target's outstanding stock); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1237 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (hostile acquiror made $73 per share cash offer for any and all shares of target).
See also I M. LIProN & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOIJTs 6.1 - 6.3.3 (1987) (discussing various defensive tactics available to directors when faced with takeover threat).
' Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Directors are not afforded business judgment protection until
they prove a "good faith and reasonable investigation" of the threat, and that these responses were "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. See infra notes 10, 25-32 and
accompanying text.
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tion' is afforded. Antonio is glad he is not a shareholder in a New
York corporation. New York courts would not require directors
to bear the initial burden of proving business judgment rule protection under a standard like Unocal. Is Antonio correct in his assumption that Delaware courts will use the "goodly" Unocal test to
carefully scrutinize board decision-making, before invoking business judgment rule protection?
Delaware courts, like most jurisdictions, have traditionally held
that directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders. 4 However, with the increase in mergers and acquisitions
8 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The business judgment rule is a
presumption that "in making a business decision directors have acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." Id. See infra notes 7, 18-24 and accompanying text (additional application of
business judgment rule).
See Loftland v. Cahill, 118 A. 1, 3 (Del. 1922) ("directors of a corporation are trustees
for the stockholders, and their acts are governed by the rules applicable to such a relation,
which exact of them the utmost good faith and fair dealing, especially where their individual interests are concerned"); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238-39 (Del. Ch. 1938) (it is
accepted that fiduciary duties and obligations of an officer and director of corporation are
such that "if a business opportunity comes to him which is in the line of his corporation's
activities and of advantage to it, and especially if really intended for it, the law will not
allow him to divert the opportunity from the corporation and embrace it as his own."),
affd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). See also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
264 (2d Cir. 1984) (directors owe duties of care and loyalty to corporation and shareholders); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to shareholders when actions taken by Revlon were self-serving and at expense of shareholders);
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (reviewing corporations attempt at takeover bid, court starts analysis with "basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation's stockholders"); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) ("director must execute duties with recognition that he acts on behalf of
others"); GrandMetro., 558 A.2d at 1055 (corporate directors have fiduciary duty to act in
best interests of corporate shareholders); Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal
Propriety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977, 987-90 (1983)
(discussion of duty of care and duty of loyalty owed to company by management). See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, 621-25 (1983) (discussing directors' duty
of care).
Many states have adopted a statutory duty of care based on the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, which states in pertinent part:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member
of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984). See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717
(McKinney 1987) (based on REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT). See also Harrington,
supra, at 987 n.47 ("[s]even states have statutorily adopted the Model Act wording, an
additional nine have judicially adopted its ordinary negligence standard . . .").

Business Judgment Rule
in recent years,' Delaware courts have grappled with defining the
legal duties directors owe to shareholders in the hostile takeover
setting.' In their struggle the Delaware courts have looked to the
business judgment rule' and to the test articulated in Unocal Corp.
Bartlett & Andrews, The Standstill Agreement: Legal and Business ConsiderationsUnderlying Corporate Peace Treaty, 62 B.U.L. REV. 143, 143 (1982) (competition has increased number of mergers and acquisitions); N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1989 at 5 (great increase in mergers
and acquisitions over past twenty five years). See Sommer, Hostile Tender Offers: Time for a
Review of Fundamentals, in TENDER OFFERS 256 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985) ("disquiet has
mounted as the size of takeovers has steadily mounted .. .");Note, The Business Judgment
Rule in a Hostile Tender Offer: Tearing at the Seams of a Confusing Doctrine - Norlin v. Rooney
Pace, Inc., 17 RUTGERS L.J. 321, 321 (1986) (discussing substantial growth, both in number
and ferocity, of struggles for corporate control in recent years). See also A. KRAMER & J.
MCCORD, MERGERS AND AcquiSITIONS 1-24 (1969) (providing early surveys explaining increased number of mergers and acquisitions).
' See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (court decided that in takeover attempt when tender offer is made directors owe fiduciary duty to
stockholders); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179
(Del. 1985); (court must determine whether, in takeover setting, concessions made by directors "out of concern for their liability to noteholders rather than maximizing the sale
price of the company for the stockholders' benefit breached a fiduciary duty directors have
to stockholders"); Grand Metro. Public Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (court decided that "in discharging their managerial function, the directors owe
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders and those principles apply with equal force to a corporate merger and to corporate takeover issues.") (citing Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179). See also supra note 4 (discussing directors' duties of care and
loyalty).
See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (description of business judgment rule).
See also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))
(business judgment rule applies to director actions if fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are
satisfied); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. "[B]usiness judgment rule is an acknowledgement of
the managerial perogatives" of directors. Id. There is a presumption that directors' action
was in best interest of corporation. Id. (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124
(Del. Ch. 1971)); Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 124 (business judgment rule determines if directors
have breached their fiduciary duties).
Because directors of a corporation are charged with strong fiduciary duties to both the
corporation and its shareholders, the business judgment rule "exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors."
Smith, 488 A.2d at 872 (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981)).
"The rule itself is a 'presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief' that" it was
in the company's best interest. Smith, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811).
Consequently, Delaware directors acting in conformance with their power to manage the
business affairs of the corporation under title 8, § 141 (a) of the Delaware Code, are generally entitled to business judgment protection. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 872 (Del. 1985) (benefit of business judgment rule given to corporate directors); C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, GUIDE
TO THE TAKEOVER LAW OF DELAWARE 21 (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
"(a) The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1988).
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v. Mesa Petroleum' for guidance." Because of Delaware's prominent
role in this area of the law, this Note will focus on the Delaware
courts.1 0
In the hostile takeover context, the business judgment rule is
generally accepted as the standard of judicial review for gauging
the defensive measures of directors." This rule places the initial
burden of proof on the shareholders to overcome the presumption that board decisions are proper. 2 However, Delaware courts
8 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
' Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The court used five criteria as guidance to determine the
permissibility of defensive acts before it afforded the directors protection under the business judgment rule. Id. First, the board must show that it had reasonable grounds to take
the action. Id. (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)). Second, the
board must act in good faith. Id. Third, proof of reasonable grounds and good faith is
enhanced if the board is composed of disinterested directors. Id. Fourth, the board must
make a reasonable investigation of the tender offer. Id. Fifth, the defensive tactic must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Id. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Public Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. 1988) (explaining criteria listed in Unocal; business
judgment protection not granted when board decision to keep poison pill in place failed
Unocal); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343-44 (Del. 1987)
(court upheld street sweep under Unocal and business judgment rule); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (court used business judgment rule and Unocal
standard to uphold purchase rights plan); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 801 (Del. Ch. 1988) (proposed sale of corporate division was acceptable defensive maneuver under Unocal test), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). Cf. Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). Delaware courts
have also charged directors with the fiduciary duty of "getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company" where the board has recognized "the company was up
for sale." Id. Generally, the company is "up for sale" when the board entertains various
offers for the company's sale, or "the dissolution of the company becomes inevitable." Id.
at 184. But see, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94514, Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935 at 69-73 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, States library,
Del file) (when board negotiates friendly merger transaction and hostile acquiror intervenes, company is not "up for sale" within meaning of Revlon), affd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del.
1989).
"0See Johnson & Millon, Misreadingthe Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1862 (1989)
(Delaware law governs one half of all New York Stock Exchange listed corporations); Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporation Law, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 709, 714 (1987)
("slightly more than one-half of the largest U.S. firms are incorporated in Delaware");
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at DI, col.l ("Delaware is the state of incorporation for about
180,000 corporations and is the legal home to many of the nations best-known corporations."); Black, Legal Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (national law of takeovers evolves in
Delaware); Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1984, § 2, at 33(w) (Delaware Chancery Court is
major corporate battleground).
" See Greene, Recent Tender Offer Developments: On the Edge or Deep In?, 45 OHIo ST. L. J.
721, 729 (1984) (due to reluctance to get involved and complicated nature of actions,
courts chose business judgment rule as easy solution); infra notes 18-24 and accompanying
text.
13 See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder burden of proof

Business Judgment Rule

have recognized that directors, through their defensive measures,
sometimes act for the primary purpose of retaining control."'
Therefore, first in Bennett v. Propp'4 and then within the context
of the formal test in Unocal,15 the Delaware courts have shifted
the initial burden of proof to directors. Under the Unocal test, directors must first justify their defensive action before receiving
the benefit of business judgement rule protection."
This Note will examine the relationship between the business
judgment rule and the Unocal test in the hostile takeover setting.
In addition, it will discuss the complications arising from the
broad deference Delaware courts have granted to director decisions under these standards. This Note will propose that the business judgment rule and the Unocal test are substantively equal as a
result of the excessive judicial deference given to director rationale under the directors' burden of proof. By requiring directors to
prove only that which is presumed under the business judgment
rule, Delaware courts have slowly reduced prominent judicial
standards to vacuous principles that are insufficient to protect
shareholder interests."7 It is suggested that unless Delaware courts
are willing to adopt a more critical analysis of reviewing director
decisions, shareholder interests will not be sufficiently protected.
Finally, this Note will propose that a truly enhanced burden will
under business judgment rule).
" Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
" 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
10 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (in control situation initial burden of proof automatically
shifts to directors); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) (director has initial
burden to show action is in corporate interest). See also Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1198
(1981).
Given the serious and unavoidable conflict of interest that inheres in any decision on
one's own ouster, courts - ought not to make available to a manager resisting a
tender offer - and in effect, fighting against his own replacement - the same deference accorded to the decisions of a manager in good standing.
Id.
7 See Johnson & Siegel, CorporateMergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 315, 375-76 (1987) (although it was surmised that courts' reluctance to second
guess directors' decisions may lead to inconsistent standards, it was concluded that courts
are generally not qualified to undertake more thorough review); Buxbaum, The Internal
Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1683 (1985) (courts have
limited or eliminated shareholder authority over structural decisions through expansion of
business judgment rule).
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result if shareholder plaintiffs were to bear the initial burden of
proof without having to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule. Once the burden has shifted, the directors
would be permitted to demonstrate the degree to which their business judgment should be protected by proving the Unocal factors.

I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
AND UNOCAL

The business judgment rule functions to protect directors from
shareholder actions brought in response to the implementation of
takeover defense tactics. " The rule is a general presumption that
board decisions have been made on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that board action was taken in the
best interests of the corporation. " If directors satisfy the rule's
presumptive elements then, absent any abuse of discretion 0 or
1" See Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 (9th Cir.
1984) (directors protected under business judgment rule when court approved no-shop
provision which foreclosed competing offers); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1987) (court recognized that business judgment rule protected
directors in corporation's self-tender offer that excluded minority shareholder from making bid for corporation); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985)
(flip-over rights plan held valid under business judgment rule therefore directors obtained
judicial protection). But see Note, Dual Class Recapitalization and Shareholder Voting Rights,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 108 (1987) (fiduciary obligations prohibit directors from resisting
takeover that offers fair price and will not harm corporation).
"8 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954
(quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Kaplan v. Centex Corp.,
284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420,
140 A. 264, 268 (1927). See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 17, at 323 n.27. The business
judgment rule serves a twofold purpose: first, directors should not be exposed to liability
for decisions they made in good faith and in what they perceived to be the best interests of
the corporation. Id. Second, since shareholders entrusted directors to make decisions, they
must also give them "latitude to take risks" without being held liable for failure. Id. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1980) (business judgment rule applies to takeover
contexts). See generally E. FOLK. THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 75-81 (1972) (discussing principles and applicability of business judgment rule).
The business judgment rule should be applied in accordance with state corporate law. See
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (application of business judgment rule is state
corporate law question); Note, Corporate Auction and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Thrid Generation Business Judgment Rule, 87 MICH. L. REV. 276, 280 (1988) (directors' business
judgment will be evaluated by "standards of conduct required by state law").
20 Cottle v. Storer Communications, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (defendant
directors entitled to business judgment protection unless plaintiff shows abuse of discretion); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (absent abuse of discretion, directors decision respected by
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gross negligence, 1 the directors' decisions will not be questioned
by most courts. 2 This rule has only placed "the rudiments of limits"2 " on the discretion of directors in pursuing plans of action
they feel are necessary for the future of the corporation.2 '
courts).
" Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). The court found that directors
were grossly negligent in failing to act with "informed reasonable deliberation." Id. at 881.
The directors approved the "sale" by relying on a two hour oral presentation without
prior knowledge of the matter, and the premium was accepted without prior appraisal of
the subsidiary. Id. at 876. The court held that in the aggregate this constituted gross negligence. Id. at 881. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57 (since directors had reasonable belief
that company was vulnerable to threat posed by potential acquiror, their judgment did not
amount to "gross negligence."). See also Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349,
351 (Del. Ch. 1972) (gross negligence is breach of fiduciary duty). Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (absent gross overreaching, business judgment rule
applicable). See generally Kreider, Corporate Takeovers and the Business Judgment Rule: An
Update, 11 J. CORP. L. 633 (1986) (development of gross negligence as standard for reviewing boards' business judgment), reprinted in 30 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 117, 123-125
(1989).
" See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. If the decision was made on informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that it was in best interests of company, it will be respected by
the court. Id. See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
("Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's decision can be
,attributed to any rational business purpose.' ") (quoting Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720). See
generally Buxbaum, supra note 17, at 1677 ("court pays exaggerated respect to the black
box of managerial function"); S. Lorne, Acquisitions and Mergers: Negotiated and Contested
Transactions §4.05 (3)(a), at 4-101 (1985) (courts acquiesce to director decisions because
they are unqualified to second guess these decisions). But see Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co.,
517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stockholders should not be denied opportunity
to tender shares in reliance on equity principles); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 285
A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) ("[IInequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.").
" Note, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.: Unbridled Discretion of Management to Resist Hostile
Tender Offers, 33 MERCER L. REV. 647, 650 (1982).
" Note, supra note 23, at 650. But cf. Note, False Halo: The Business Judgment Rule in
CorporateControl Contests, 66 TEx. L. REV. 843, 844 (1988) (rule remains presumption, not a
standard of conduct; "instead of applying the business judgment rule mechanically, [in
takeover cases] courts have begun to analyze carefully the directors' faithfulness to their
fiduciary duties to the corporation").
See Smith, 488 A.2d at 872. The elements making up the business judgment rule, such as
making an informed decision, acting in good faith and with the honest belief that it is in
the best interests of the corporation, focus on the individual director's knowledge of material information at the time just prior to the decision. Id. The courts must rely on the
directors' interpretations of the surrounding circumstances in order to determine if they
have met the criteria of the business judgment rule. Id. See also Harrington, supra note 4,
at 1001. Referring to the court's unwillingness to analyze such important issues as the fairness of a transaction or an obvious conflict of interest, Harrington notes that "[t]he natural
instinct of the courts [is] to avoid such thorny thickets of review ...." Id. "[Tihe reluctance of the courts to face these issues has all too often resulted in a total distortion of the
business judgment rule and a misapplication of the rule to cases in which it should never
have been applied." Id.
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However, because of the increased liklihood that directors will
forsake the interests of shareholders in the hostile takeover setting, Delaware courts require directors to satisfy the "enhanced"
burden of the Unocal test before they are afforded business judgment rule protection. " ' In Unocal, a minority shareholder made a
two-tier front loaded tender offer 6 for 37 percent of the corporation's outstanding stock at a price of $54 per share.2 7 After determining that the offer was coercive and that the price was inadequate, the Unocal board of directors implemented a selective

exchange agreement28 as a defense against the tender offer.29 Recognizing the risk of self-interested motives, the Delaware Supreme
Court placed a dual burden of proof on the directors: first, they
were required to prove that there were reasonable grounds for
believing that corporate policy and effectiveness was in danger;
See supra note 17; infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of
business judgment rule in protecting shareholder interests).
$5 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. In the hostile takeover context, directors have the initial
burden of proof. Id. at 955. This burden is satisfied upon a showing of "good faith and
reasonable investigation," and a reasonable response. Id. See Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. T 94514, Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935 at 79 (Del. Ch.
July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (in hostile takeover setting directors must
overcome Unocal standard before obtaining business judgment protection), af'd, 565 A.2d
280 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del.
1987) (same); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986). "This potential for conflict places upon the directors the burden of proving
that they had reasonable grounds for believing there was a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness, a burden satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation."
Id.
" See Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Trade Offers, in TENDER OFFERS 273 (M.
Steinberg ed. 1985). A two-tier front loaded tender offer is:
[a] two step acquisition technique in which the first step (front end) is a cash tender
offer and the second step (back end) is a merger in which remaining shareholders of
the subject company typically receive securities of the bidder valued below the cash
consideration offered in the first step tender offer.
Id. at 274 n.l.
" Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
"8 Id. at 951. A selective exchange agreement occurs when a company implements a
"self-tender for its own shares which excludes from participation a stockholder making a
hostile tender offer for the company's stock." Id. at 949.
" Id. at 956. The court stated:
[T]he Unocal directors had concluded that the value of Unocal was substantially
above the $54 per share offered .... [T]he board stated that its objective was either
to defeat the inadequate Mesa offer or, should the offer still succeed, provide the
49% of its stockholders, who would otherwise be forced to accept "junk bonds,"
with $72 worth of senior debt.
Id.
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and second, they had to show that the defensive measures taken
were reasonable in response to the threat posed." If the directors
sustained this burden, it became the plaintiff's task to establish director fraud, bad faith or self dealing by a preponderance of the
evidence.8" The Unocal court held that the defensive measure in
question was reasonable under the circumstances, and thus invoked business judgment protection.3
II.

THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN THE TAKEOVER CONTEXT:
COMPLETE PROTECTION FOR DIRECTORS

The business judgment rule is most frequently applied when decisions of directors are challenged in the takeover context.3 3
When directors reject a bidder's tender offer they often base their
decision on "the inadequacy of the bid, the nature and timing of
the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on constituencies
other than shareholders, the risk of nonconsummation, and the
basic stockholder interests at stake, including the past actions of
" See Id. at 955, 958. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585,
606 (Del. Ch.) (two prong Unocal test applied when board resists takeover bid), affd, 535
A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (same). See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 17, at 329 (general
discussion and expansion of Unocal requirements).
"'See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958. Once the burden shifts to the plaintiff, "unless it is shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based ...
on some . . . breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or
being uninformed, a [c]ourt will not substitute its judgment for that of the board." Id. See
also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (burden of going
forward with evidence shifts back to plaintiff after directors satisfy Unocal standard). But see
Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (defendant entitled to summary judgment unless plaintiff first shows genuine issue of fraud, bad faith or
abuse of discretion); Wolf v. Fried, 473 Pa. 26, 373 A.2d 734, 735 (1977) (even absent
proof of fraud or self dealing, "directors of a corporation may be held personally liable
where they have been imprudent, wasteful, careless and negligent and such actions have
resulted in corporate losses.") (stating holding in Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa.
563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966)).
s Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949, 959 (Del. 1985).
See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984). See also Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980) (business judgment rule applicable in takeover context); Unocal, 493 A.2d 954 (same); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
("The function of the business judgment rule is of paramount significance in the context of
a derivative action."); Kaplan v. Centex Corp. 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. 1971). Business
judgment rule applies to takeovers. Id. See generally Kreider, supra note 21, at 636-37 (explains circumstances in which business judgment rule applies).
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the bidder and its affiliates in other takeover contexts."' 4 The
Delaware courts have granted deference to board decision-making
because of the extensive number of factors it involves and the recognition that the board has more experience in corporate matters
and is privileged to pertinent information concerning its own affairs .3 The shareholders, by contrast, are viewed as unable to
make informed decisions."
Directors in Delaware corporations enjoy a wide latitude of discretion because the courts consider themselves unqualified to second-guess director decisions. 7 If directors can demonstrate any
rational business purpose, in spite of other concerns, their decisions will prevail." Consequently, directors have almost absolute
Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341-42; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-56 (board must balance various factors when deciding reasonable course of action); Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94514, Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935 (Del. Ch. July 17,
1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file), affd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989). See generally Lipton
& Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities: An Update, ABA NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE CONTROL 7 (December 8, 1983). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defense Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733,
1746-50 (1981) (authors argue for "managerial passivity" which would require directors to
acquiesce when confronted with a tender offer). But cf. Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107, 110 (1980) (requiring "passivity" would, "in effect, put the company up for sale to the highest bidder at all
times").
" Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985) (board in better position to
gather relevant information, therefore court defers to their "informed" decision). See
Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule & Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?,
37 Bus. LAW. 27, 32-33 (1981) (court's refusal to second guess director decisions is major
rationale under business judgment rule); supra notes 17 and 22. Cf. Hanson Trust PLC v.
ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 286 (2d Cir. 1986) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (courts
are ill-equipped to evaluate business judgment).
" See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 1196 (plaintiff/shareholders, just like
courts, lack experience and information necessary to intelligently challenge managerial decisions); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 34, at 111 (shareholders unable to make decisions that will best serve their collective self-interest); supra notes 17 & 22.
'7 See supra notes 17, 22 & 36 (discussing Delaware courts' unwillingness to second guess
director decisions).
" Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (court will not
substitute its judgment for board's if "latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational
business purpose' ") (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))
(emphasis added). See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341
(Del. 1987) ("directors' decisions are presumed to have been made on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
company") (emphasis added); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964) (directors
not "penalized" if decision seemed reasonable at time made). See generally Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 34 at 1748-49 (debating whether rational business purpose can be
formed when board action forecloses shareholder premium and depletes corporate treasury with litigation expenses).
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discretion in deciding what is in the best interest of both the corporation and its shareholders.3 9 Unfortunately for shareholders in
the hostile takeover context, the exercise of director discretion
often precludes shareholders from obtaining a guaranteed capital
gain on their investment, usually in the form of a premium over
the current market price of the stock.'
See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("Delaware court will not substitute its judgment for that of board, provided that the answer the
Board gave can be attributed to any rational business purpose and .. . that the standards
required by Unocal have been met.") (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
726 (Del. 1971)). See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (court will-not second guess board decision); Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720 (Del.
1971) (court "will not substitute its notion of what is or is not sound business judgment").
Several policy reasons have been put forth to justify defensive measures as sound business judgment. For instance, the board may claim that they are able "to obtain greater
value for the shareholders." Gilson, Delaware's Intermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality,44 Bus. LAw. 247, 260 (1989). The board can also justify
its defensive measures by claiming it could achieve a better price "by preserving the target's independence and generating value internally." Id. at 262. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Del. 1987) (standstill agreement limited
hostile offeror's control of target, "thereby assuring the latter's continued independence");
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94514, Nos. 10866,
10670, 10935 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (Time board entered merger agreement that precluded hostile offer to preserve "Time Culture," and to
promote policy decision to manage for "long term" value of company), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280
(Del. 1989). However, Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that board policies of resisting
tender offers or maintaining company independence operate to the shareholders detriment, and should therefore be restricted. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 34, at 1737
(stockholders worse off when defensive tactics preserve independence); Easterbrook &
Fishel, supra note 16, at 1174-75 ("If the company adopts a policy of intransigent resistence and succeeds in maintaining its independence, the shareholders lose whatever premium over market value the bidder offered or would have offered but for the resistance..
• ."1).

In cases of self-perpetuation, the courts have invalidated a board's decision only when it
was the sole or primary motive for their actions, not merely an underlying motive. Cheff,
199 A.2d at 554. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., Inc., 501 A.2d 401, 408 (Del. 1985)
(improper motive of self-perpetuation overrides protection of business judgment rule);
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (court enjoined management's acts which attempted to perpetuate themselves in office by obstructing legitimate
efforts of dissenting stockholders to undertake proxy contest).
" See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (court upheld
"defensive" acquisitions used to thwart takeover due to antitrust law), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (court
deemed purchase of rights plan that diluted acquirer's holding in target corporation to be
reasonable in relation to threat posed); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (court upheld self-tender
offer excluding certain shareholder participation where directors reasonably believed certain shareholders presented danger to corporate policy and effectiveness); Harrington,
supra note 4, at 1005 ("board can take, with impunity, virtually any action it wishes to
frustrate" a tender offer); supra notes 17 & 35.
40 See Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, in MERGERS
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By straining to insulate directors from liability at the expense of
shareholders, Delaware courts have reduced the business judgment ule to a mere token standard, enabling a court to sanction
virtually any business decision.4 1 This effectively clothes directors
with an "almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of
fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion.14 2 The approach taken by
the Delaware courts effectively insulates directors from liability
because the directors are obliged to merely present post hoc reationales to justify their defensive policies. 43 This post hoc protection undermines the very purpose of the business judgment rule"
AcQuIsIIoNs 267 (M. Keenan ed. 1982) ("[Bidding firms paid target stockholders an
average premium of 49 percent for the shares they purchased."). See, e.g., Panter, 646 F.2d
at 280 (shareholders lost premium when defensive measures were upheld); Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. III. 1982) (directors of target corporation sold
"crown jewel" asset thereby lowering value of company to detriment of shareholders),
af'd, Nos. 82-1305, 82-1307 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982); Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 94514, Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935 at 73 (Del. Ch. July 17,
1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (Time shareholders precluded from realizing Paramount's $200 per share offer in return for higher speculated returns in future), affd, 565
A.2d 280 (Del. 1989); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the BusinessJudgment Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 655 (1983) ("stringent application of the business judgment rule creates
an almost insurmountable barrier to relief for shareholders who have been denied the opportunity to sell their shares at a substantial premium"). Cf. Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug
Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 (9th Cir. 1984) (merger agreement with no-shop
clause provision precluding acceptance of competing offers could be valid before approval
by shareholders which might preclude them from possible capital gain).
" See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 286 (2d Cir.
1986) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (policy underlying business judgment rule is twofold: courts
are ill-equipped to evaluate business judgments, and there is no available objective standard
to judge correctness of board decisions); Panter, 646 F.2d at 299. (Chudahy, J., dissenting)
(courts' use of business judgment rule is moving closer "to shredding whatever constraints
still remain upon the . . . corporate directors ....");Buxbaum, supra note 18, at 1683.
The courts have limited or eliminated shareholders' ultimate authority over structural decisions via an expanded definition of "business judgment," therefore there are few checks
upon the directors. Id. See also Harrington, supra note 4, at 1001 (courts' reluctance to
review substance or motivation of board action has "often resulted in total distortion of the
business judgment rule"). See generally Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 300 (3d Cir.
1980) (court upheld "scorched earth" and "lock up option" defense where friendly bidder
was given option on target's securities), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
"' Panter v. Marshall & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
" Panter, 646 F.2d at 299 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). See supra note 38.
44 See Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, in TENDER OFFERs 273, 285
n.44 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985). "First, if management were liable for mere good faith errors
in judgment, few capable individuals would be willing to incur the financial and emotional
risks of serving in such roles. Second, courts are generally ill-equipped to evaluate business
judgments. Finally, management has the expertise to . . .makje] such determinations." Id.
AND
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because it allows protection not granted upon the true rationale
of a decision, but rather upon some convenient justification. "
Criticizing this "hands off" approach to the conflict, the dissent in
Panterv. Marshall Field & Co. accurately warned of directors channeling their expertise to their personal advantage and to the detriment of the corporation and its shareholders.' The minimal standards used to evaluate defensive director action taken without
shareholder approval, and the Delaware courts' implicit trust of
those actions, are no longer justifiable in light of the certain conflict of interest between directors and shareholders in the hostile
7
takeover situation.4

III. Unocal: LIMITED PROTECTION FOR SHAREHOLDERS IN HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS

The Delaware courts have applied the Unocal test to defensive
measures in a hostile takeover setting, 48 recognizing that directors
Note, supra note 40, at 651 (policy of business judgment rule is to "allow directors the
discretion to formulate effective company policy [J... encourage[] competent people to
become directors without fear of personal liability [and]... relieve[] the courts of the burden of second guessing complex corporate decisions").
" See supra notes 17, 22, 38, 43 and accompanying text. See generally Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 34, at 1745-47 (business judgment rule should not be applied to directors who are resisting tender offer due to inherent conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers and courts' unwillingness to second-guess business decisions).
" Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target
Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV. 403, 435-37 (1980). Hostile tender
offers create unavoidable conflict of interest. Id. at 436. The directors are interested in
protecting their position and holdings; therefore, their decisions might not truly reflect
what is in the best interest of the corporation or its shareholders. Id.
" See Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of CorporateDirectors in Takeover
Contests, 11 SEc. REG. L. J. 44, 69-70 (1983) (discussing danger of business judgment rule
when board actions are not in best interest of shareholders); Buxbaum, supra note 17, at
1727-32 (recognizing inability of Delaware courts to properly address management defensive strategies, and concurrent need for checks on board authority); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 16, at 1198 (courts should not grant deference to managerial decisions resisting
tender offer because of "unavoidable conflict of interest that inheres in any decision on
one's own ouster"); Kreider, supra note 21, at 648-50 (discussing trend of courts to secondguess "business judgment of the directors by imposing their own judgment in the interest
of fairness to shareholders"); Note, DiscriminationAgainst Shareholders in Opposing a Hostile
Takeover, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 1319, 1322 (1986) (discussing arguments in favor of prohibiting
defensive measures by board). But see Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 34, at 109 (managerial resistance to tender offers creates bargaining process which ultimately benefits
shareholders).
48 E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc., v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 94514, Nos.
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"[do] not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat
by any Draconian means available." ' The courts look to the additional burden of satisfying the Unocal criteria as a means of guarding against "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders."5 Although it may appear that a requirement of reasonableness is an additional burden upon directors, it
is submitted that the Unocal requirements have in fact provided
shareholders with insufficient protection. The Unocal standard is
substantively equal to the business judgment rule as a result of the
expansive judicial deference 1 given to board rationale under the
board's burden of proof. Unless the Delaware courts are willing to
critically examine these rationales, the purpose of Unocal is undermined and the requirment of proof serves little purpose.
The first prong of the Unocal test requires directors to prove
that they conducted a "good faith and reasonable investigation"
of both the perceived threat and the corporation's possible defenses.53 The directors can satisfy this burden by demonstrating
10866, 10670, 10935 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (court reviews defensive measures to hostile takeovers under Unocal test), affid, 565 A.2d 280 (Del.
1989). See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A. 2d 1334, 1341-44 (Del.
1987) (probability of success of claim must be analyzed under well-established standard of
UnocaO; Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) (same); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Ch.) (court applied Unocal test to
defensive measures implemented to thwart takeover), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.
1988); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(same); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986) (same). See supra note 1 (definition of hostile takeover).
4, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341 (explaining Unocal policy);
Johnson & Siegel, supra note 17, at 329 (explains application of enhanced burden of
Unocal).
" See supra notes 17, 38 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware courts' unwillingness to substitute its judgment for that of board).
" See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Unocal test).
88 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See Grand Metro. Pub., 558 A.2d at 1055 (first element satisfied by good faith and reasonable investigation); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987) (same).
In a similar case, a tender offer was made that was noncoercive and contained no threat
of injury to the shareholders or the corporation. AC Aquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. 1986). As a defense, the board implemented a selftender of a higher amount for "65 percent of its outstanding stock at $60 per share cash."
Id. at 104. The court held that this competitive "alternative," based on economic considerations, satisfies the first prong of Unocal because it serves a valid corporate purpose. Id. at
112. It has been recognized that the ease of meeting this threshold requirement is that
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that they were not grossly negligent in reaching an "informed decision."" The Delaware courts have granted deference to board
rationales for "informed decisions" in all but extreme circumstances; so, realistically, the burden under Unocal's first prong can
be easily satified. 55 Informed decision-making, for example, has
been shown simply by proof of an extended discussion of a proposed defensive measure with legal consultants 56 or a board's recognition of the tender offeror's past actions in other takeover contexts.5 " One Delaware court has gone as far as presuming that an
informed decision existed where a board of directors simply determined the company value.58 Thus, the "informed decision" prong
directors do not have to prove "a danger existed to corporate policy and effectiveness ...
[and] directors can almost always cite a conflict in policy between the corporation and the
bidder." Johnson & Siegel, supra note 17, at 330. See also Note, Corporate Auctions and
Directors' FiduciaryDuties: A Third-GenerationBusiness Judgment Rule, 87 MICH. L. REv. 276,
286 (1988). "A reasonably cautious board that is aware of its obligations under the duty of
care will have little difficulty satisfying this threshold, procedural inquiry." Id. The first
prong is simply meant to identify some rational business purpose behind the board's actions ..
" Id. But see Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
93,924 at 90,197-98 (Del. Ch. 1989) (single meeting with offeror's representatives was rejected as reasonable investigation because it was "little more than a charade").
" See Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (board satisfied
first prong of Unocal by presenting proof that decision was informed and not grossly negligent); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). Directors must act in an
informed and deliberate manner. Id. Duty of care in Delaware prescribes that "informed"
decision-making be evaluated on a gross negligence standard. Id. Johnson & Seigel, supra
note 17, at 332 (duty of care requires informed decision); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)
(1974) (Delaware's statute requires informed decision making by directors).
" See infra note 73 and accompanying text (only three cases exist in which directors did
not meet Unocal standard).
" See, e.g., Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. The court stated:
The Directors were given beforehand a notebook which included a three-page summary of the Plan along with articles on the current takeover environment. The extended discussion between the board and representatives of Wachtell, Lipton and
Goldman, Sachs, before approval of the Plan reflected a full and candid evaluation
of the Plan.
Id. The court concluded that the board made an informed decision since it was not grossly
negligent in its review under these circumstances. Id.
57 See, e.g., Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1342. The court stated: "[t]he series of Ivanhoe maneuvers, including the secret acquisition of shares, the 'bear hug' letter, the coercive partial
tender offer and inadequate bid were all viewed by the defendants as classic elements of
Mr. Pickens' typical modus operandi." Id. Furthermore, he had a reputation of acquiring
and breaking up corporations. Id. From these facts the board could conclude the offer was
not in the best interest of the shareholders. Id. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985). Board can properly consider the past actions of the
bidder and its affiliates, in other takeover contexts, when determining what is best for the
corporation. Id.
See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 795, 798 (Del. Ch.)
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of the Unocal test places no significant burden on directors because it requires them to satisfy only that which is presumed
under the business judgment rule: that a decision was made on
"an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.""
The second prong of the Unocal test requires that director response be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 60 In determining the reasonableness of the response, the focus is on "the
nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise.""1 An appropriate response is illustrated by Delaware's policy of upholding board decisions when the board demonstrates the
existence of either a conflict between the hostile offer and their
corporate policy, or a valid business purpose underlying the
board's decisions. 62 In an example of the former situation, the
court has found board activity reasonable when the board effectively rejected a hostile offer by revising a merger agreement in
order to carry out long term corporate policy." In an instance of
the latter situation, the Delaware court has recognized as a rea(board made informed decision based on good faith belief that corporate restructuring
would produce higher share value than that of offer tendered), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d
1070 (Del. 1988). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (Unocal
analysis is not applied where decision based on twenty minute oral presentation of proposal
and unsupported valuation of company's worth was not considered informed.)
6 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Many courts have reaffirmed Aronson's definition of the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987) (quoting Aronson definition of business judgment rule); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986)
(same); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (same).
" Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See generally Johnson & Siegel, supra note 17, at 330-39
(1987) (discussing simplicity of overcoming relatively reasonable response standard established under Unocal).
e Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341-42. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
" See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957 (selective exchange offer motivated by valid business purpose held reasonable); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94514, Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file)
(board's restructuring merger transaction motivated by valid strategic business concerns
held reasonable), affd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989). But cf. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112-13 (Del. Ch. 1986) (board's creation of alternatives
to outside company's offer motivated by valid business concern, but options held unreasonably defensive).
63 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94514, Nos.
10866, 10670, 10935 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (corporate
policy of preserving Time's "culture" justified board's defensive actions), aff'd, 565 A.2d
280 (Del. 1989).
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sonable response a "comprehensive defensive strategy""' employed to "maintain the company's independence. ' 65 In City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc.,6 the Delaware Chancery Court stretched
the concept of "reasonable response" to include prophylactic
board decisions made prior to the actualization of any threat.67
In determining reasonableness, Delaware courts have recognized that they must "employ[] the Unocal precedent cautiously,"" because if "inartfully applied, the Unocal form of analysis could permit an unraveling of the well-made fabric of the
business judgment rule ... ."" It is proposed that such an unraveling has in fact occurred. Delaware's unjustifiably cautious and
deferential application of the second prong of the Unocal test sterilizes the test and renders it substantively equivalent to the business judgment rule.
Given the comparative standards of the Unocal test and the business judgment rule, 0 the only difference between the two is that
Unocal places the burden of proof upon the directors while the
business judgment rule presumes this burden in their favor. 1 It is
submitted that this difference is not a distinguishable factor in
lvanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345. A comprehensive, defensive strategy included a standstill
agreement, a declarations of dividends, and a street sweep. Id. at 1336-37. The court stated
that, "Newmont's actions ... are so inextricably related, the principles of Unocal require
that they be scrutinized collectively as a unitary response to the perceived threats." Id. at
1343.
" Id. at 1345. "Newmont's directors had both the duty and responsibility to oppose the
threats presented by Ivanhoe and Gold Fields." Id. The board determined that the offer
was inadequate and coercive. Id. at 1342. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (directors have duty to protect corporation "from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source").
551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
e See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 17, at 330-31 (1987) (Unocal applied where no threat
to corporate policy existed).
" City Capital Assocs. Ltd v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). This caution is evidenced by the fact that only two cases
have ruled that boards used disproportionate defense measures relative to the takeover
threat. Id. at 796 n.9. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94514, Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, at 85-86 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) ("it is prudent to keep in mind that the innovative and constructive rule of
Unocal must be cautiously applied"), aff d, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
66 City Capital Assocs., 551 A.2d at 796.
" See supra note 59, 69 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between and
comparison of business judgment rule and Unocal).
"' See supra notes 12, 16, 25 and accompanying text (discussing placement of burden of
proof under Unocal and business judgment rule).
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light of the judicial deference given to board decisions. 2 The burden of proof distinction serves little purpose because the courts
willingly defer to virtually any showing put forth by directors.
This deference is evidenced by the infrequency in which the
board has failed to sustain its burden of proof in attaining business judgment protection under Unocal."3
Most states have recognized that a more effective review of
board activity is achieved when the shareholder plaintiff is required to sustain the initial burden of presenting evidence of director fraud, bad faith or self-dealing in the hostile takeover setting."4 Following the lead of these other states, the Delaware
courts should require shareholders to sustain the initial burden of
proof and should not grant directors the business judgmznt rule
presumption. The Delaware courts could then incorporate the
"2See Note, supra note 53, at 288 (in applying second prong of Unocal Delaware courts
"show great deference toward a target board's reasonable determination that an offer
poses a threat to the corporate enterprise."); Johnson & Siegel, supra note 17, at 338-39
(discussing superficiality of Unocal in relation to directors duty of loyalty and courts deferential treatment to board decisions).
" See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 588 A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. 1988) (defensive threat insufficient to warrant board's responsive action); Robert M. Bass Group, & Co.
v. Evans, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 93,924 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (same); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112-15 (Del. Ch. 1986) (minimal
"threat" more like probable non-preference for remedy of coercive shareholders). Since
Unocal, only three cases exist in which the defensive steps were found disproportionate to
the threat posed. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 n.9 (Del.
1988).
"' See Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1989) (burden of proof on plaintiff
under Michigan law); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273
(2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff in New York bears initial burden of proving directors breach of
fiduciary duty resulting from defensive tactics to takeovers); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2nd Cir. 1980) (burden of proof on plaintiff; applying New
Jersey rule); Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 1984)
(under Illinois law burden of proof on plaintiff); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp.,
675 F. Supp. 238, 256 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (plaintiff in Pennsylvania bears initial burden of
proof). See generally Note, supra note 40, at 656. "[P]laintiff should be required to show
that there is a substantial likelihood that the directors will be replaced upon successful
completion of the tender offer ... the burden should [then] shift to the directors to show
that their conduct was fair and reasonable." Id. See alio Note, Target Directors' Fiduciary
Duties: An Initial Reasonableness Burden, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 722, 726 (1986).
The majority of courts accordingly do not place an initial burden on a board of
directors before they can enjoy the presumption of the business judgment rule.
These courts require the plaintiff to first present evidence that the directors acted
on an uninformed basis, in bad faith, or primarily or solely for the purpose of
preventing a change in control to keep themselves in office.
Id.
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Unocal factors as guidelines for determining if directors have met
their burden of proof.7 5 Thus, rather than being dispositive on
the question of the legitimacy of board action, the Unocal factors
would be available to directors as an aid toward establishing the
proper degree of protection due under the business judgment
rule. As it now stands, Delaware's practice of placing the initial
burden of proof on the directors7 6 under the Unocal standard critically hampers the proper scrutiny of board action because directors have merely been required to sustain-the relatively easy burden of establishing the elements of the business judgment rule."
This requirement, in conjunction with the Delaware courts' unwillingness to second-guess board action,"8 leaves Delaware unable
to adequately protect its shareholders in the hostile takeover
setting.
CONCLUSION

The Delaware courts have failed to adequately protect shareholder interests through the application of the business judgment
rule and the Unocal test. Under the business judgment rule, the
Delaware courts have strained to grant deference to the expertise
of directors and have been unwilling to second-guess their decisions. As a result, virtually any business decision can be shown to
have been made in good faith and in the honest belief that it was
in the corporation's best interests.
" See supra notes 9, 34 and accompanying text (factors considered by board in implementing defensive measure and factors reviewed by court in determining permissibility of
board action).
76 See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987)
(citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). "[T]he directors [have] the burden of proving that they
have not acted solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office, that
the threatened takeover posed a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, and that the
defensive measures adopted are reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. See also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (explaining policy
reasons for requiring board to bear initial burden of proof); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.
500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) (recognizing need for placing initial burden of proof on
directors because judiciary has increased concern over drastic actions taken by directors to
remove unwarranted takeover threats). See generally Kreider, supra note 21, at 636-38
(1989) (describes burden of proof in takeover offers); Note, supra note 74, at 727-28 (discussing why initial burden is on directors).
" See supra notes 59, 68-71 and accompanying text (rational decisions upheld).
18 See supra notes 17, 22, 35, 38 and accompanying text (discussing courts' unwillingness
to second-guess board).
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In order to effectively protect shareholder interests, Delaware
should adopt a more critical analysis of the rationales underlying
board decisions. This had been attempted in the hostile takeover
setting, in which the Unocal test has been purportedly erected as a
barrier to business judgment protection. The Unocal test, however, is limited as a means of reviewing board decisions and is insufficient to protect shareholders from improper board activity.
Board decisions could be more effectively reviewed by requiring
the shareholder to sustain the initial burden of proof without having to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule.
If the burden were shifted to the shareholders, directors would be
permitted to establish the necessary degree of protection accorded
their business judgment using the Unocal factors, instead of initially benefiting from the rule. This form of analysis would better
allow board activity to be viewed with a critical eye, and therefore
diminish the initial deference the Delaware courts have been willing to grant directors.
Frank Cara & Peter F. Lane
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